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ABSTRACT 
Allowing first responders to access emergency-support information for which they 
are normally not authorized can save lives and property. A trusted emergency 
management solution was developed at the Naval Postgraduate School to 
provide transient access to sensitive information during an emergency. This 
document provides a high-level design analysis for performing distributed 
emergency signaling for this system over a tactical IP network. We describe how 
the protocol supports the emergency management concept of operations. The 
document specifies requirements pertaining to emergency signaling and includes 
an analysis that describes the system response to all possible emergency state 
transitions. We also review various communication protocols and evaluate their 
merits with respect to their suitability for use on emergency networks. Detailed 
design analysis supports the commencement of an emergency management 
implementation phase. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis documents the analysis and design of performing emergency 
signaling within a tactical IP network. It provides high-level recommendations for 
the choice of communication protocol, and provides concrete design 
requirements pertaining to the signaling mechanism. 
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Crises can occur anywhere and at any time without warning. The 
emergency team members whose job is to deal with such situations may be 
geographically dispersed. These first responders may include medical services 
personnel, firefighters, law enforcement officers and resource coordinators. To 
be able to efficiently handle a crisis, the emergency team requires timely access 
to information and must be coordinated in its actions. The combination of 
communication and coordination is the key to an effective response to help save 
lives and limit damage [1].  
Crisis response may involve occasional access to privileged or sensitive 
information that is beyond the security clearance of an individual. Such 
information may include floor plans, infrastructure schematics, city transit system 
plans, or even the medical records of disaster victims. Government policy makers 
and third-party data providers may be unwilling to release this information if they 
lack confidence in the ability of emergency systems to protect their data relative 
to its confidentiality, sensitivity, and privacy. As such, access to privileged 
information is often denied to first responders. 
Many proposals were put forth to overcome such hurdles. We could 
temporarily elevate the security clearance of the first responder, or temporarily 
downgrade the security labels of the information. Both approaches require 
human intervention. Elevating an individual security clearance typically requires 
extensive background checks which prevents timely access to information. This 
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approach may also provide the individual with excessive access resulting in other 
security implications. Downgrading of security labels is likely to be disallowed 
due to the need to provide global and persistent policy enforcement. Also, it 
might provide too little access unless it is performed on a large scale basis. 
A better solution involves developing a Transient Tactical Access to 
Sensitive Information (T-TASI) system that can process, store, and distribute 
information of different security classifications. Privileged information provided by 
third party data providers is kept in secure emergency partitions on the first 
responders’ devices. The T-TASI system, also known as the E-Device, will 
enforce stringent access control such that the confidential data is accessible only 
in extraordinary situations with authorization from the authority. In these 
situations, the data is made available in a controlled and confined manner such 
that when the emergency ends, the T-TASI system is able to lockdown the 
emergency partitions and revoke all privileged information that was accessed 
during the emergency. 
For this approach to be feasible, the authority needs to maintain a global 
emergency state. This state shall be synchronized throughout the emergency 
network via the use of a secure emergency signaling mechanism. A detailed 
design analysis is required to determine the implementation approach.  
B. OBJECTIVE 
The thesis should help answer the following questions: 
What are the requirements for secure emergency signaling? 
Which communication protocol should be used to meet these 
requirements? 
How should the signaling mechanism be designed and integrated into the 
existing tactical T-TASI system framework? 
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The thesis’s contribution is in providing design guidance for secure 
transmission and a detailed design analysis for the processing of the emergency 
signals. The analysis shall provide sufficient details to commence the 
implementation phase. 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is organized as followed. 
The first chapter presents the problem definition and highlights the 
research questions that the thesis will address. 
The second chapter provides background information that is relevant to 
understanding the problem domain. We will describe the concept of operations 
(CONOPS) in which the T-TASI system operates and provide a brief overview of 
prerequisite knowledge that will help the reader in appreciating the technical 
portions of the thesis. 
The third chapter presents the conceptual requirements of the emergency 
signaling and the high-level security objectives. We review the communication 
protocols and evaluate them based on how well they support the CONOPS. 
The fourth chapter discusses the high-level design of each of the major 
subsystems. It will cover state transitions and message semantics.  
The fifth chapter presents a detailed analysis of the subsystems by 
describing the control flow and call parameters. It includes the required data 
structures and will provide sufficient details to commence the implementation 
phase. 
The final chapter reviews related work, provides direction for subsequent 
research, and closes with a concluding section. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides background information relevant to understanding 
the problem domain for signaling emergency status to tactical emergency 
devices. We will describe the CONOPS from the perspective of how the E-
Device will be used. The T-TASI system implementation, or E-Device, is a small 
form factor device that serves as the target platform to validate the concept of 
transient security in the field. The security architecture implemented in the E-
Device will be elaborated in this chapter. We also provide an overview of the 
internet protocol security (IPSec) and public key infrastructure (PKI) for readers 
who may not be familiar with them. 
A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
The proposed concept of operations relies on having emergency teams 
comprised of individuals from various public safety organizations. These 
individuals may include members from the medical services, firefighters, law 
enforcement officers and resource coordinators who are required to 
communicate and share information as authorized during emergencies. Each of 
them will be equipped with an E-Device, which is a handheld computer that 
provides a mobile emergency response capability with which sensitive 
information can be securely processed, stored and distributed.  
The E-Device is configured at the depot before being issued to the users. 
It will be installed with trusted software that ensures sensitive information is 
confined to partitions associated with sensitivity equivalence classes. There will 
be no flows between partitions, with the exception of inter-partition flows allowed 
by the security policy. The cryptographic keys that are used to verify user identity 
and encrypt messages will also be installed. As the E-Device is intended to serve 
as a dual-use terminal, day-to-day applications that are frequently used will also  
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be installed. The partitioning and confinement of applications and data 
establishes the security foundation with which the E-Device provides a secure 
computing environment. 
A central authority known as the Tactical Operation Center (TOC) will be 
responsible for coordinating the emergency response. Prior to or during an 
emergency, information may be distributed to the E-Devices. The E-Device relies 
on a robust communication infrastructure in order to receive information from the 
TOC. If such an infrastructure is unavailable at the scene, an incident area 
network (IAN) to provide temporary coverage will be setup. An IAN is a network 
that is created for a specific incident and is typically provided by a wireless 
access point attached to the first responder’s vehicle or a specific IAN node [2]. 
If it is deemed that the response team requires access to sensitive 
information, the TOC, with pre-approval from the relevant data provider(s), will 
declare an emergency state. This state will trigger temporary but controlled 
access to an emergency partition maintained on the E-Device where sensitive 
information is stored, thus allowing the user transient access to sensitive 
information, as seen in Figure 1.  This information may include floor plans, 
infrastructure schematics, city transit system plans, or medical records of disaster 
victims for which tactical team members are normally not authorized. 
 
Figure 1.   Emergency Network Architecture (After [3]) 
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When the transient access is no longer required, the TOC will declare the 
end of the emergency. This will trigger a lockdown of the emergency partition. 
Before the lockdown occurs, users will be provided with a grace period to save 
their work within the emergency partition. The duration of the grace period is 
configurable and can be disabled depending on policy requirements. Once the 
emergency partition is locked down, the user is prevented from accessing the 
sensitive information held within that partition.  
B. TRUST MODELS 
The secure use of E-Devices in the field is based upon a trust model [3] 
where the TOC is an entity that owns the E-Devices. The TOC installs its own 
trusted software and communication keys in these devices so that they can be 
trusted to enforce security policies. This establishes a trust relationship between 
the TOC and its E-Devices from which the TOC is able to securely distribute and 
receive sensitive information. In our emergency scenario, third party data 
providers have ownership of the privileged information that is used within the E-
Devices. Hence, they too will need to establish cryptographic key-based trust 
relationships with the TOC and jointly agree on the security policies used by the 
E-Devices to access the privileged information. The TOC enforces these policies 
by means of its trusted software installed within the E-Devices. This results in a 
transitive trust relationship formed from the third party data providers to the E-
Devices via the TOC. 
In our emergency scenario, the E-Device may allow “extraordinary 
access” by which privileged information that the user is not normally authorized 
may be accessed. The protection of such emergency information is two-fold: the 
security policy allows extraordinary access only when the user is in the 
emergency partition and only during an emergency declared by the TOC. 
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C. TRANSIENT TACTICAL ACCESS TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION 
SYSTEM 
The E-Device was developed to support the transient tactical access to 
sensitive information (T-TASI) system that is a research project at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Center for Information Systems Security Studies and 
Research (NPS CISR). 
 The T-TASI system was developed as a security architectural blueprint 
for resource constrained devices. It supports high assurance devices that can be 
relied upon to process, store, and distribute sensitive data and handle user 
interactions. The E-Device is a prototype to validate this concept. It is able to 
switch between three runtime modes – normal, trusted, and emergency – where 
one or more dedicated partitions are associated with each mode. Normal mode is 
the environment that will be most familiar to the user. In this mode, he is able to 
download, install, and run common workplace productivity applications accessed 
through the normal partition. Trusted mode allows the user to interact with the 
device in a high assurance manner and access the trusted path partition. This 
mode is accessible by means of a Secure Attention Key (SAK). Emergency 
mode is accessible only during an emergency that is declared by the TOC. This 
emergency state is triggered by means of an emergency signal (i.e. emergency 
state message) from the TOC that is sent over a secure channel. When the 
system is in this mode, the user is allowed to enter the emergency partition in 
order to access to privileged information from third party data providers during 
the duration of the emergency state. The T-TASI security architecture is 
displayed in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.   Security Architecture (After [4]) 
The following provides key highlights of the E-Device [4] and describes an 
overview of its major subsystems. 
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1. Least Privilege Separation Kernel 
The Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK) creates exported resources 
from the platform’s physical resources, partitions the exported resources and 
controls interactions between the partitions. It allocates its exported resources on 
the E-device into discrete partitions. Users can only interact with one partition at 
a time. 
2. Trusted Services Layer 
The Trusted Services Layer (TSL) virtualizes certain LPSK resources for 
the use of partition applications (e.g. commercial OSs), and associates security 
labels with the kernel’s exported resources. The TSL supports emergency 
management. In addition, the TSL manages the emergency partition as a 
protected staging area where emergency information is confined, and where 
users are provided with transient access to the information. The TSL ensures 
that information does not leave the Emergency Partition (except for writing to the 
third party data providers via a trusted network channel). The TSL ensures that 
only authorized users may access the Emergency (or any other) Partition. The 
net result is that the only way a user can ever access emergency information is 
through an Emergency Partition during an emergency. 
3. Trusted Executive 
The Trusted Executive (TE) provides process services for applications in 
the trusted partition. They include operating system services, application 
management services, session management, and document sealing. 
4. Trusted Partition 
The Trusted Partition hosts high integrity applications and data that 
provide trustworthy functionality. Trusted Partition services include the Trusted 
Path Application (TPA), which acts as a gatekeeper for user access to partitions, 
as directed by the TSL. This partition contains an Emergency Manager that is 
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responsible for initiating emergency state, and a heartbeat manager that 
periodically transmits keep-alive messages to the TOC for providing situational 
awareness. 
5. Emergency Partition 
This partition hosts applications and data that have been provided by the 
third party data providers. The data is accessible only when an emergency state 
is declared. The application may run on top of commercial operating systems. 
Depending on established security policies, there can be multiple emergency 
partitions each belonging to a data provider, or one emergency partition shared 
by a set of data providers. 
6. Normal Partition 
Each Normal Partition hosts user applications and data that are used 
during day-to-day activities. Typically, these applications run on commercial 
operating systems. The services in the Normal Partition are those most familiar 
to the users and offer functionally rich user interfaces.  
D. INTERNET PROTOCOL SECURITY 
This section provides a brief overview of IPSec. The aim of this section is 
to provide a basic overview of what the protocol does and its implementation 
options. Knowledge of this topic is useful in allowing the reader to appreciate the 
rationale of our design recommendations for the use of IPSec (see Chapter IV). 
IPSec is a framework of open standards for ensuring private 
communications over public networks [5].  It is a network layer security protocol 
that is typically used to create Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). A VPN is built on 
top of existing physical networks and is able to provide several types of data 
protection. These include confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and replay 
protection. IPSec has the following components: 
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• Two security protocols, Authentication Header (AH) [6] and 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [7] 
• Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocol 
• IP Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp) 
AH and ESP can be used in either transport or tunnel mode (see following 
figures). 
 
Figure 3.   AH Tunnel Mode (From [5]) 
Figure 3 shows AH in tunnel mode. In tunnel mode, AH creates a new IP 
header and encapsulates the original IP packet. This setup provides integrity 
protection to both the outermost IP header (excluding mutable fields such as 
Time-To-Live) and the original IP packet. 
 
Figure 4.   AH Transport Mode (From [5]) 
Figure 4 shows AH in transport mode. Under this mode, AH does not add 
a new IP header; instead, it relies on the original IP header. This setup provides 
integrity protection to the entire IP packet (excluding mutable fields in the 
header).  
 
Figure 5.   ESP Tunnel Mode (From [5]) 
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Figure 5 shows ESP in tunnel mode. ESP in tunnel mode creates a new 
IP header and encapsulates the original IP packet. This setup provides both 
encryption and integrity protection for the original IP message. However, there is 
no integrity protection for the outermost IP header. 
 
Figure 6.   ESP Transport Mode (From [5]) 
Figure 6 shows ESP in transport mode. Under this mode, ESP does not 
create a new IP header; instead, it relies on the original IP header. This setup 
provides encryption only to the original IP payload and that there is no integrity 
protection for the IP header. 
The other components of IPSec are Internet Key Exchange (IKE) and IP 
Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp). IPSec uses IKE to negotiate 
connection parameters between two endpoints. It defines the encryption 
algorithm, integrity protection algorithm, authentication method, and Diffie-
Hellman (DH) groups. The use of IPComp is optional in IPSec. It is used to 
specify whether IPSec should compress packet payloads before encrypting 
them. 
E. PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE 
A public key infrastructure (PKI) is a set of policies, processes, server 
platforms, software and workstations used for the purpose of administering 
certificates and public-private key pairs, including the ability to issue, maintain, 
and revoke public key certificates [8]. Such an infrastructure is essential in 
binding public keys to entities, and providing key management in a distributed 
environment such as the one used by our emergency networks. Functional 
elements of a PKI encompass a certification authority (CA), registration authority 
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(RA), certificate revocation list (CRL) and PKI users. Like the IPSec section, this 
section is provided as background to support design recommendations in later 
chapters. 
1. Digital Certificate 
Digital certificates provide a means of proving user identity in electronic 
transmission. It contains information that identifies the CA issuing it, the 
subscriber names, the subscriber's public key, and the validity period. In addition, 
it must also be digitally signed by the CA issuing it. 
2. Certification Authority 
A certificate authority (CA) is an authority that is trusted to issue and 
manage public key certificates and the certificate revocation list (see below). It is 
the critical building block of a PKI and is a collection of hardware, software and 
people who operates it. It has four main responsibilities: 
• Creates, signs, and issues certificates 
• Maintain certificate status information and issues CRL 
• Publishes current certificates and CRL 
• Maintains archives of status information about expired certificates 
that are issued 
3. Registration Authority 
The registration authority (RA) is responsible for identification and 
authentication of certificate subjects, but it does not sign or issue certificates [8]. 
Its responsibility is to verify certificate contents for the CA. 
4. Certificate Revocation List 
A certificate revocation list (CRL) is a list maintained by the CA listing all 
the certificates that were issued but revoked prior to their stated expiration date 
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[8]. Best practices dictate that the CRL should be consulted whenever one relies 
on a digital certificate. Failing to do so may mean that a revoked certificate may 
be incorrectly accepted as valid. Of course, such an approach requires one to 
have an updated copy of the CRL. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided the background information for understanding 
the problem domain. In the next chapter, we proceed with the requirements-
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III. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
This section discusses the results of our requirements-gathering process 
for signaling emergency status to the E-Devices. Military organizations, such as 
the Marine Corps, have many emergency situations similar in urgency to those 
faced by civilian disaster response. References to emergencies in this document 
are intended to apply to both civilian and military applications. The findings from 
this phase will influence the network protocol selection, the Emergency State 
Message (ESM) messaging format, as well as the design of the ESM module. 
Note that the communications requirements in this chapter provide high-level 
recommendations regarding the choice of protocol, whereas the Heartbeat and 
ESM Manager sections provide concrete design requirements to form the basis 
of the high-level design to be presented in Chapter IV. 
A. CONCEPTUAL REQUIREMENTS 
The declaration of emergency state through the transmission of an ESM is 
a central theme in the CONOPS. The TOC maintains a binary global emergency 
state and notifies the E-Devices of any state change by sending an ESM. Upon 
receiving this message, the emergency partition within the E-Device will be 
unlocked thus providing the authorized user with temporary access to its 
privileged data. In order to provide accountability to the data providers, the TOC 
is required to track the extent to which privileged data is shared. To achieve this, 
the E-Device will need to acknowledge receipt of the ESM by replying to the 
TOC. Hence, we can derive the following two requirements: 
Conceptual Requirement 1 
The TOC, and no one else, shall be able to send an authentic ESM to E-
Devices 
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Conceptual Requirement 2 
Upon successful validation of a received ESM, the E-Device shall send an 
acknowledgment of its receipt to the TOC 
Conceptual Requirement 3 
The E-Device shall allow access to the emergency partition by authorized 
personnel when the emergency has started 
Conceptual Requirement 4 
The E-Device shall prohibit access to the emergency partition when the 
emergency has ended. 
All of the above shall be performed in a secure manner using trusted 
mechanisms. The rest of this chapter will define what is required to create such a 
mechanism. 
B. HIGH-LEVEL SECURITY OBJECTIVES 
This section expands on the conceptual requirements by defining them in 
terms of confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, and non-repudiation 
aspects. According to [9], there shall be technical controls that enforce these five 
measures on wireless information systems. 
Confidentiality The ESM shall be kept secret so that only the intended 
recipients are able to understand its content. There is little reason why an 
emergency state declaration should be made known to the public. Transmitting 
such information in the clear may allow enemies and other malicious parties to 
intentionally interfere with emergency response. 
Integrity The ESM receiver shall be able to detect modifications to the 
message that have occurred since its transmission by the TOC. Such 
modifications can fall into two groups. The first group is intentional modifications 
that are performed by malicious attackers. These include man-in-the-middle 
attacks where the ESM might be modified to indicate emergency start instead of 
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emergency end, thereby allowing unauthorized access to privileged data. The 
second group falls under unintended modifications such as accidental changes to 
data as a result of communication channel errors. 
Authenticity The receiver shall be able to validate the sender of the 
received ESM. This is required as the policy dictates that only the TOC can 
declare emergency states. If there is no authenticity, malicious entities can 
impersonate the TOC and allow access to privileged data within the emergency 
partition. 
Replay Protection The receiver shall be able to prevent replay attacks so 
that an earlier ESM, when retransmitted, does not initiate another emergency 
state declaration. 
Non-Repudiation The TOC shall be provided with a proof of ESM 
acceptance that allows the TOC to identify those able to access privileged 
information during a particular emergency. This provides accountability to third 
party data providers and the assurance that the emergency responders have the 
necessary data access for efficient crisis handling. 
The above items reflect the security requirements essential for signaling 
emergency status from the TOC to the E-Devices. The next step is to determine 
the technologies that are used to fulfill them. 
C. COMPARISON OF COMMUNICATION ALTERNATIVES 
This section examines key communication protocols and analyzes them 
based on the network protocol layer at which they function. A TCP/IP model [10] 







Figure 7.   TCP/IP Model 
The motivation for a layer-based analysis is that many of the protocols’ 
characteristics are based on the layer from which they originate. The analysis 
focuses on how protocols associated with each layer can meet the CONOPS 
requirements with respect to its confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, replay 
protection, and non-repudiation. We will use the term CIARN to collectively 
represent these policy components. In addition, we will also judge the layers 
based on the ease with which applications can be implemented. Note that this 
comparison only looks at services offered by the reviewed layer and not in 
conjunction with other layers. The analysis shows the basic capabilities of each 
layer, which is sufficient for the design recommendations. A combinatorial 
analysis of the capabilities of multiple layers is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
although a gross combination is shown in Table 1. 
1. Link Layer 
Communication protocols operating in the link layer focus on point-to-point 
security. The controls at this layer are used to protect the information in the IP 
header and its payload that are transmitted over a specific physical link. 
Link layer controls provide good confidentiality over point to point links and 
are suitable for communication that takes place between nodes that have a direct 
physical link to each other. Our CONOPS requires the TOC to communicate with 
E-Devices over public networks that may be operated by many different Internet 
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Service Providers (ISP). To deliver a message to intended recipients requires the 
data to go through insecure intermediate nodes, where the IP header (and its 
payload) would need to be decrypted to know the destination IP address that is 
residing in the encrypted IP header. Hence, the entire packet will be decrypted in 
order to determine the next hop and subsequently re-encrypted for transmission. 
There is also a key distribution problem in equipping intermediate nodes with the 
necessary keys for decrypting the ESM.  
Since the packets would have to be decrypted at each intermediate node, 
this protection choice increases the possibility of exposure of sensitive 
information to malicious attacks. The attacker may control one of the 
intermediate nodes, thus allowing him to modify the packets before encrypting 
them for their next transmission. This modification cannot be detected with a link 
layer solution. Since this solution lacks integrity protection, it is also impossible to 
meet the other CIARN requirements. 
2. Internet Layer 
Internet layer controls are applied to all connections from the host and is 
not application-specific. For example, all network communications between two 
hosts or networks can be protected at this layer without modifying any 
applications on the clients or the servers. 
Unlike the link layer approach where the ESM needs to be decrypted to 
determine the next hop, the routing information in this method is readily available 
in the IP header. An internet layer protocol provides end to end security through 
the use of shared secret keys among the communicating parties. Replay attacks 
are prevented through the use of nonces. Authenticity and non-repudiation are 
derived by signing outgoing data with a private key. Message authentication 
codes that are computed based on the ESM content and a shared secret key can 
accompany the ESM to provide integrity protection. 
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Another advantage of using an internet layer solution is its ability to hide 
the IP address of the destination node. When E-Devices generate 
acknowledgments for an ESM, the destination IP field contains the IP address of 
the TOC. This provides attackers with another vector of attack and should be 
avoided. Instead, this packet can be tunneled and encrypted within another IP 
packet. Traffic analysis will only reveal that the packet is directed to a VPN 
gateway without compromising the TOC.   
3. Transport Layer 
Transport layer controls are used to protect the data in a single 
communication session between two hosts. It cannot protect internet layer 
information such as the IP information as it resides above that layer. In addition, 
applications typically need to be modified to use transport layer controls. A 
transport layer solution will also provide end-to-end security through the use of 
shared secret keys among the communicating parties. Similar to an internet layer 
solution, it will employ the use of nonces and message authentication codes to 
protect the ESM. 
This solution requires a transport layer protocol such as TCP or UDP to be 
developed in the TML. Unlike the internet layer solution where the 
implementation is transparent to the applications, the ESM Manager will need to 
specifically work with the transport layer solution. This imposes unnecessary 
implementation requirements, increases the complexity of the Trusted Computing 
Base (TCB), and thus, makes formal verification difficult. In addition, the IP 
address of the TOC is readily observable to traffic analysis.    
4. Application Layer 
Application layer controls are used to protect the data across 
communication sessions between two applications. This approach provides a 
very high degree of flexibility and customization over the application’s security.  
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However, the need to establish separate controls for each application often 
incurs significant overhead. It is also difficult to design and implement secure 
application controls. 
It is technically possible to apply application layer controls to the ESM 
Manager. However, unless it is using proven and tested security protocols, it 
could be extremely difficult to verify any new design for its cryptographic 
soundness. It is also challenging to ensure that they are implemented properly. 
Doing it incorrectly may create more vulnerabilities instead. The problem is 
exacerbated when every new application has to develop its own security 
controls. This leads to duplication of effort resulting in a larger TCB. Furthermore, 
if the solution entails the use of keys, there will be logistic and management 
overhead in distributing multiple sets of keys to every E-Device. This creates 
additional overhead and unnecessary implementation complexity in the TCB and 
should be avoided. 
Lastly, application layer solution has the same disadvantage of not being 
able to protect TCP/IP information because this information is at a lower level. 
This subjects the TOC to unnecessary exposure. 
5. Results 
Table 1 briefly summaries the suitability of each communication solution 
based on the CONOPS requirements. It is assumed that the security controls are 
implemented and configured correctly. An X in the cell indicates that the 
requirements are met for a specific category. 
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Layer      X X 
Internet 
Layer X X X X X X X 
Transport 
Layer X X X X X   
Application 
Layer X X X X X   
Table 1.   Comparison of Alternatives for Communication Protection 
We select a solution by considering both CIARN requirements and overall 
impact to the system. Specifically, the solution must be able fulfill its 
requirements in a manner that does not add considerable complexity to the TML. 
The findings showed that internet, transport, and application layers are 
generally able to achieve the CIARN requirements. However, the internet layer 
solution also provides protection against traffic analysis. This helps to minimize 
exposure to the TOC by hiding its IP address. 
In terms of system complexity, in general, higher level controls provide 
greater flexibility at the cost of increased complexity. The complexity comes from 
additional dependencies on other components, and having many of them 
performing similar functionalities. Such an approach represents a major hurdle 
when performing either formal verification or informal analysis of the TCB. It is 
generally agreed that complexity is the enemy of security [11, 12, 13]. Hence, a 
simpler design that is able to fulfill the requirements is preferred. 
In summary, we compared the merits of each design by considering the 
extent that it meets the CIARN requirements and the ease of its implementation. 
The internet layer solution was the obvious choice based on the below 
differentiators: 
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• Ability to protect TOC’s IP address from traffic analysis 
• Security implementation is transparent to the ESM module 
• Security implementation can be reused by other applications 
• Can be implemented without significant TCB footprint 
• End to end security as opposed to point to point 
The current standard for securing IP communications is Internet Protocol 
Security (IPSec). The rest of the report will discuss what is required for secure 
communication of ESM and will assume the use of IPSec within the T-TASI 
system framework.  
D. HIGH-LEVEL REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY STATE 
PROCESSING 
This section highlights the high-level requirements pertaining to the ESM 
module on the E-Device. The requirements are described in terms of “shall” and 
“should.” The “shall” requirements describe mandatory requirements that are 
essential in supporting the CONOPS. These requirements must be incorporated 
in the final design. Requirements described using “should” are not directly tied to 
the CONOPS but are nonetheless beneficial to the system. They comprise of 
best practices and useful attributes that enhance the system in non-tangible 
ways such as making the system more scalable or modular. 
1. Emergency State Management 
It is imperative that applications first check the validity of their data prior to 
processing. Incorrect data may be malicious or accidental. In either case, 
processing invalid data is likely to result in unintended system behavior and may 
potentially induce a breach in security. We have made it mandatory for the E-
Device to validate the ESM before processing it. The requirements are shown in 
Table 2.  
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Group Requirements Identifier 
The E-Device shall verify the correctness of the ESM 
prior processing it. 1.1 
The E-Device shall verify that the ESM is from the TOC 
prior processing it. 1.2 
The E-Device shall acknowledge receipt of an ESM to 
the sender of the ESM upon successful validation of a 
received ESM 
1.3 
The E-Device shall allow access by authorized users to 




The E-Device shall prohibit access to the emergency 
partition when the emergency has ended 1.5 
Table 2.   ESM Requirements 
2. Communication 
The communication subsystem provides a means to transfer data packets 
among E-Devices or to the TOC. It includes IPSec and operates at a lower layer 
than the ESM. As of this writing, the ESM and Heartbeat Managers are the only 
users of these services. However, it is very likely that additional applications will 
use the communication subsystem in the future and it is essential that the design 
allow that, because a redesign to support a broader set of applications would be 
costly. The requirements are shown in Table 3. 
Group Requirements Identifier
Interface should be modular and usable by higher layer 
applications. 2.1 
All communicating parties shall support a common set of 
IPSec protocols. 2.2 
All communicating parties shall support a common set of 
IPSec modes. 2.3 
All communicating parties shall support a common set of 
cipher suites. 2.4 
Communication 
All communicating parties shall standardize on whether 
the use of compression is required. 2.5 
Table 3.   IPSec Requirements 
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3. Emergency Applications 
This section incorporates an additional heartbeat application to the E-
Device. The purpose of this application helps the TOC to better perform crisis 
management by knowing the location of the E-Devices. These requirements are 




TOC should be able to estimate the number of 
emergency responders that are near the emergency 
scene. 
3.1 
Table 4.   Emergency Application 
4. Testing 
All of the above requirements are assigned an identifier. The purpose of 
this identifier is two-fold: First, it serves as a traceability mechanism so that 
mapping between the requirements to the design can be ensured. Second, it is 
used to reference the test cases used to validate that the system meets all its 
requirements. Note that the focus of this thesis is on formulating high-level 
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IV. HIGH-LEVEL DESIGN 
Our CONOPS requires the TOC to perform secure signaling of emergency 
status to the E-Devices. In the previous chapter, we broke down this broad set of 
requirement into its constituents. These constituents can be categorized under 
each of the three subsystems as shown in Table 5. 
 




Provides secure channel to and 
from the TOC for purpose of 
transmitting heartbeat messages 
and receiving emergency signals 
2.1 – 2.5 IV.A, IV.B 
Heartbeat 
Manager 
Provides situational awareness 
to the TOC by publishing the 




Processing emergency signals 
from the TOC and activating 
emergency state on the E-
Device 
1.1 – 1.3 IV.D 
Table 5.   Overview of New Subsystems 
These subsystems have been identified as new additions to the T-TASI 
system framework and Figure 8 shows the envisaged system architecture that 




Figure 8.   Proposed System Architecture 
The E-Device is being built using the Least Privilege Separation Kernel 
[14], which utilizes the four hardware privilege levels (PLs) available in the Intel 
x86 processor [15, 16]. These PLs are protection domains that are arranged in a 
hierarchy ranging from most privileged (PL0) to least privileged (PL3). 
Components that play a key role in enforcing system security will be in a more 
privileged hardware domain. The concept of emergency signaling requires a 
vertical slice implementation that will span the various hardware PLs. The rest of 
this chapter discusses the high-level design for each of the new subsystems, 
starting from IPSec and working up through UDP, Heartbeat Manager, and ESM 
Manager. The IPSec and UDP sections provide high-level design 
recommendations, whereas the Heartbeat and ESM Manager sections provide 
enough detail to form the basis of a proof of concept design analysis in Chapter 
V. 
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A. INTERNET PROTOCOL SECURITY 
IPSec can be used to establish a trusted channel between two parties. 
However, there are multiple ways of accomplishing this task given its flexible 
nature. In this section, we highlight the deployment and implementation issues 
and propose a way to use IPSec within the T-TASI system. 
1. Protocol and Mode 
Combining both AH and ESP appears to maximize confidentiality and 
integrity protection. However, such an approach has some drawbacks. First, as 
AH provides integrity protection to the outermost IP header, any change in this 
header will fail the integrity checks. This results in AH being incompatible with 
network address translation (NAT) protocols. In NAT, the source IP address is 
often changed from a private to a public address. Hence, AH integrity protection 
at the destination host will not match. Although there are NAT Traversal (NAT-T) 
techniques to overcome this limitation [5, 17, 18], they cannot cope with protocols 
such as File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 
(LDAP) [19]. The reason being these protocols embed the peer IP addresses 
within the application packet. In addition, NAT-T adds complexity to existing 
implementations by requiring NAT-T discovery among the edge devices and 
additional UDP encapsulation [20]. Second, AH does not provide confidentiality 
and needs to be deployed with either ESP or used in conjunction with application 
level encryption.  
The use of ESP is essential as we are not provisioning for application level 
encryption. The use of AH is required if integrity protection is required for the 
outermost IP header. In our case, it is unnecessary, as the successful 
authentication of the original IP payload already proves that it came from 
someone with the corresponding private key. That by itself should provide 
adequate assurance. The outermost IP header is only used to address the 
packet to the recipient, and should not affect the interpretation of the packet. 
Hence, the use of ESP is recommended. 
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The use of tunneling over transport mode is recommended as tunneling 
will hide the destination IP address of the message. In the context of the ESM, 
this address is the private IP address of the TOC. This increases protection 
against traffic analysis and reduces exposure for the TOC host. 
The use of AH and transport mode should be removed from our IPSec 
implementation as they will not be used. The removal of unused code results in a 
smaller memory footprint, which can be useful for resource constrained devices. 
Following the Reference Monitor Concept [21], the IP module is kept small so 
that it can be subjected to analysis and tests to assure its correctness. 
2. Cipher Suite 
The interface to the encryption suite contains security parameters that can 
be used to select encryption schemes to protect IPSec communication channels. 
They include the choice of encryption algorithm, integrity protection algorithm, 
authentication method, and DH groups. It is beyond the scope of the thesis to 
analyze each of the possible choices. Instead, the design shall rely on 
recommendations put forth by National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) [5], National Security Agency (NSA) [22], and the separation kernel 
protection profile (SKPP) [23]. 
At the heart of the E-Device is the LPSK which is being constructed to be 
conformant with the SKPP. The protection profile states explicitly that the target 
of evaluation shall use NSA approved cryptographic mechanisms. It further 
states that this includes NIST FIPS-validated cryptography with additional NSA-
approved methods for key management and for cryptographic operations. 
Hence, the NSA Suite B Cryptography package [22] was selected for the 
cryptographic primitives. It can serve as an interoperable cryptographic base to 
protect information up to the SECRET level. 
The use of cryptography places a demand for higher computing resource. 
The choice of cryptographic algorithms is often a tradeoff between the need for 
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security and computational limitations. In the case of the ESM, we can afford to 
use the strongest available cryptographic mechanism in Suite B, as the 
declaration of emergency states does not take place frequently. Processing the 
cryptographic primitives will not incur significant computational overhead in 
comparison with a mechanism that must use cryptography often.  Based on the 
intended use of IPSec, the selected cipher suite is Suite-B-GCM-256 as defined 
in [24] was chosen. The suite is comprised of: 
• Encryption Algorithm: 256-Bit AES CBC 
• Integrity Protection Algorithm: HMAC-SHA-384 
• Authentication Method: ECDSA-384 
• Diffie-Hellman Group: ECDH-384 
Note that a key aspect of Suite B cryptography is its use of elliptic curve 
technology instead of classic public key technology. In order to facilitate adoption 
of Suite B by industry, NSA has licensed the rights to twenty six patents held by 
Certicom, Inc. covering a variety of elliptic curve technologies. Under the license, 
NSA has the right to grant sublicenses to vendors building certain types of 
products or components that can be used for protecting national security 
information [22]. The final choice of cryptographic suite will be made later in the 
project. 
3. IP Payload Compression Protocol 
The use of IP Payload Compression Protocol shall be disabled for two 
reasons. First, the size of ESM is small and applying compression on small 
messages does not provide significant size reduction. This also wastes 
computing resources and drains the batteries on the E-Device. Second, it helps 
to keep the TCB lean by not adding unnecessary modules. 
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4. Recommendations 
There are three ways in which IPSec can be implemented within a host 
[25].  
The first method involves integrating IPSec into the native IP stack. The 
native implementation allows all IPSec capabilities to be provided as easily as 
regular IP support. This is efficient but requires access to the IP source code. 
The second method is referred to as a bump-in-the-stack (BITS) 
implementation (see Figure 9). This approach makes IPSec a separate 
architectural layer between the native IP layer and the link layer. IPSec will 
intercept the IP datagrams as they are passed down the protocol stack. It adds 
security protection to these datagrams before handling them to the link layer. 
Availability of source code for IP is not required, thus making this implementation 
appropriate for legacy systems. 
 
 
Figure 9.   IPSec BITS Implementation (From [26]) 
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The third method is referred to as a bump-in-the-wire (BITW) 
implementation. This implementation involves the use of dedicated and inline 
security devices that are usually IP addressable and provide IPSec services. In 
the below example (Figure 10), both routers are incapable of IPSec functions and 
rely on the IPSec devices. These devices intercept outgoing datagrams and add 
IPSec protection to them. These devices also remove IPSec information from 
incoming datagrams before forwarding them to the routers. 
 
 
Figure 10.   IPSec BITW Implementation (From [26]) 
As mentioned earlier, the native implementation of IPSec within the IP 
layer offers the best performance at reduced complexity and costs. This is the 
proposed approach as the IP layer within the E-Device was developed in-house. 
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5. Summary 
This section reviews the requirements for IPSec and determines whether 
they have been met. 
Identifier Requirements Remarks 
2.2 All communicating parties shall support a common set of IPSec protocol. 
ESP shall be 
supported 
2.3 All communicating parties shall support a common set of IPSec modes. 
Tunnel mode shall 
be supported 
2.4 All communicating parties shall support a common set of cipher suites. 
Suite-B-GCM-256 
shall be supported 
2.5 All communicating parties shall standardize on whether the use of compression is required. 
Disable IPComp 
Table 6.   IPSec Requirements 
As shown in Table 6, all the IPSec requirements have been satisfied. 
B. TRANSPORT LAYER MECHANISM 
This section discusses the selection of a suitable transport layer 
mechanism for use by the ESM and the heartbeat manager in the trusted 
partition. This mechanism resides in PL2 and serves as an intermediary between 
IPSec and the applications that require its services. We use a requirements-
driven approach that analyzes the messaging needs of each application and 
determines whether its needs can be met by the IPSec layer. Any unmet needs 
that are non application specific become a requirement for the transport layer 
mechanism. Following that, we analyze how those requirements can be met. The 
chosen transport layer implementation is the one that can fulfill these needs in a 
manner that is efficient and does not violate the layering concept. 
1. Messaging Requirements 
This section discusses application-specific messaging requirements by 
listing the essential messaging features that are required by the applications and 
determine whether they can be met by IPSec. 
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The messaging features are as followed: 
Acknowledgement This refers to end-to-end acknowledgement that takes 
place when a message is delivered to the transport layer of the receiving host. If 
the sender does not receive the acknowledgement by a certain timeout, it 
resends the message subjected to a maximum number of retry and interval. 
Error Detection This refers to the use of a checksum to detect unintended 
modifications to the packet that may be caused by environmental factors. 
The messaging requirements for each application are tabulated in Table 7. 
The checkmarks under both ESM and Heartbeat Managers indicate a required 




 ESM Manager Heartbeat Manager Provided by IPSec
Acknowledgement √   
Error Detection √ √ √ 
Table 7.   Application Specific Messaging Requirements 
2. Analysis 
Figure 6 indicates that there is an acknowledgement requirement for the 
ESM Manager. This is because the CONOPS requires the E-Device to send an 
acknowledgement back to the TOC when the emergency partition has been 
unlocked. Consequently, the acknowledgement is best implemented within the 
ESM Manager rather than the transport layer because it requires application 
knowledge that is transparent to the transport layer. Hence, the ESM Manager 
will perform its own acknowledgement and does not require this service from the 
transport layer. 
Moreover, it is evident that both the ESM and heartbeat managers require 
error detection services. This feature is already provided by IPSec in its integrity 
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protection mechanisms.  As such, the applications do not require a transport 
layer mechanism and are able to send their payloads directly to IPSec. However, 
this is not an optimal solution. 
At the IP layer of the receiving end, the protocol field in the IP header is 
referenced. This field will indicate which protocol should subsequently process 
the packet. In the case of messages targeted for the ESM and heartbeat 
managers, a unique protocol number needs to be specified for each application. 
IPSec will forward the packet to the application specified in the incoming packet. 
This seems to work in theory but has three drawbacks: 
• Protocol numbers are assigned by IANA [27] and are reserved for 
protocol use instead of applications. Assigning them to ESM and 
heartbeat messages violates this convention. 
• Another approach is to bypass IANA assigned protocol numbers. 
This choice assumes that the use of the protocol numbers is kept 
internal to the emergency network. However, there is a possibility 
that these numbers may be assigned by IANA and we may need to 
switch to another unused number. 
• Whenever a new application that does not require a transport layer 
mechanism is added, the IP layer needs to be updated to 
accommodate its protocol number. This incurs additional testing 
and formal verification overhead. 
3. TCP and UDP Comparison 
We list the functions for implementation for both TCP and UDP. TCP [28] 
requires the following: 
• 3-way Handshake 




• Flow Control 
• Checksum Computation 
In contrast, UDP [29] requires only checksum computation and its use is 
not mandated. From the brief comparison, it is evident that UDP implementation 
is much simpler. 
4. Recommendations 
We propose using UDP as the transport layer mechanism because it 
meets the current messaging requirements and has slightly less implementation 
complexity. Receiving applications are identified based on a port number instead 
of protocol numbers. Adding new applications will not require change either the 
IP or UDP layers. The use of TCP will become necessary only when there are 
applications that require messaging functionalities that are not found in the IP 
layer. These applications will be highlighted in chapter VI (see Future Work). 
5. Summary 
This section reviews the requirements for messaging and determines 
whether they have been met. 
 
Identifier Requirements Remarks 
2.1 Protocol should be usable by higher layer applications. 
UDP is a well known transport layer 
protocol with established interfaces 
Table 8.   Messaging Requirements 
As shown in Table 8, the communication requirement pertaining to the 
transport layer has been satisfied. 
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C. HEARTBEAT MANAGER 
The Heartbeat Manager resides in the trusted partition and is responsible 
for providing the TOC with situational awareness regarding the E-Device. This 
allows the TOC to determine the number of emergency responders that are 
reachable across the network during a crisis. It also allows the TOC to determine 
the responders who are already in the vicinity of the incident. This is 
accomplished by having the E-Device transmit a heartbeat message to the TOC 
at periodic intervals. The sending interval is configured at the depot and is 
determined based on consideration of the number of E-Devices and the capacity 
of the networking infrastructure. 
1. Message Format 
Table 9 shows the format of the heartbeat message. The last row 
indicates the field size in number of bytes. 
 
Heartbeat Message 





1 4 8 8 2 8 8 
Table 9.   Heartbeat Message Format 
Each field is as explained as followed: 
Type This indicates a message type field. The E-Device will support 
multiple applications and the use of a type field will differentiate them from one 
another. A 1-byte field allows up to 256 different message types to be supported. 
Date/Time This is the date and time when the heartbeat message was 
transmitted. The granularity should be in terms of number of seconds from an 
agreed upon epoch date reference. A 4-byte field allows up to 136 years from the 
epoch date. 
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Sender Device ID This 8-byte field uniquely identifies the sending E-
Device 
Receiver Device ID This 8-byte field uniquely identifies the hardware 
device of the receiving TOC 
Heartbeat Counter This is a running numbering sequence that is tagged to 
each transmitted heartbeat message. The purpose is to allow the TOC to 
determine the ordering sequence of the messages. 
Longitude & Latitude This indicates the location of the E-Device. If there is 
no location information available, use 0xFFFFFFFF for this field. This could imply 
that there is no GPS coverage (i.e.  the device is under shelter) or that the GPS 
is disabled due to privacy reasons. Both coordinates are expressed in terms of 
degrees with decimal notation [30] to keep the values within the 8-byte 
constraint. 
The total size of a heartbeat message is 39 bytes. 
2. Heartbeat Interval 
There are some considerations in determining the size of the heartbeat 
interval. Setting a long interval may not provide an accurate locations status. 
Setting a short interval may potentially induce a denial-of-service on the TOC. 
This may be highly dependent on the operational context and there may be no 
optimal value for all situations. We have provided a rudimentary means to derive 
the interval based on a simple scenario. The purpose is not to provide an 
authoritative computation method, but to highlight the factors that are considered 
when deriving such a value. 
One of the purposes of the heartbeat message is to provide an 
approximate location of the E-Device. We deem that an accuracy of +/- 300 




walking speeds ranging from 1.25 m/s for older individuals to 1.5 m/s for younger 
individuals [31, 32]. Assuming the faster walking speed, this suggests a location 
update every 200 seconds. 
Let us assume that there are 500 E-Devices reporting to a TOC. This 
suggests that the TOC will receive an average of 2.5 location updates per 
second. This seemed to be rather expensive, as the creation of IPSec channels 
and the associated key exchange mechanisms may unnecessarily overload the 
TOC. We feel that an average of 1 location update every 3 seconds is more 
appropriate considering that there are other data transmissions taking place that 
involve the TOC. To achieve this average for 500 E-Devices, we require that 
each device transmit no more than once every 1,500 seconds (i.e. 25 minutes). 
The implication of an extended interval from 200 to 1500 seconds causes 
the location granularity to reduce to +/- 2250 meters. This simplified case study 
shows that necessary tradeoffs must be made between location accuracy and 
network infrastructure loading. 
D. EMERGENCY STATE MESSAGE MANAGER 
The Emergency State Message Manager resides in the trusted partition 
and is responsible for two functions: (1) Processing the received emergency 
signal from the TOC, (2) Transitioning the E-Device between emergency states 
as a result of receiving an emergency signal or a timer interrupt. 
1. Message Semantics 
In our design, the emergency signals are represented as emergency state 
messages (ESM). Each message will contain the emergency parameters shown 






MissionID Unique Emergency Identifier 
StartDate When to start the emergency  
EndDate When to stop the emergency 
GracePeriod Time provided for users to save/finish their work in the emergency partition. 
Figure 11.   List of Emergency Parameters 
While the date fields are self-explanatory, the MissionID and GracePeriod 
fields require further elaboration. Having a MissionID identifier allows the TOC to 
plan for multiple non-overlapping emergency declarations scheduled in the 
future. This also allows the E-Devices to differentiate between different 
emergencies. 
The GracePeriod field has dual functionality. Under normal situations 
when the emergency ends at a predefined end date, the user is notified 
sometime before it actually ends. This notification is based on the GracePeriod 
field. Under exceptional situations, the end date may be brought forward. In this 
case the user may no longer have sufficient time for a full grace period. In these 
cases, the emergency end date will be extended to permit a full grace period 
instead. For example, if an emergency is scheduled to end at 1500 hrs with 
grace period set to 300 seconds, then under normal situations, the user will be 
prompted to save his work at 1455 hrs. However, if an ESM was received at 
1440 hrs indicating that the end date was brought forward to 1430hrs. The user 
will be provided with a 300-sec grace period even if the end date has been 
exceeded. In our example, the new end date will be 1445 hrs. The TOC also has 
the option of disallowing the grace period. For such a scenario, the emergency 
will end immediately. 
We define an emergency (as stored on the E-Device) by Mission = 
(MissionID, StartDate, EndDate, GracePeriod). An emergency as defined by an 
incoming ESM will be given by Input = (MissionID, StartDate, EndDate, 
GracePeriod). This convention will be used in subsequent sections. 
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2. State Transitions 
We have identified four possible states that the system can be in at any 
one time, based on the relationship of the current time to a current or pending 
emergency. Changes to these states result from receiving and processing an 
ESM. The states are illustrated in Figure 12. The GraceStart label on the timeline 
indicates the commencement of the grace period and is derived by deducting 
GracePeriod from EndDate (i.e., GraceStart = EndDate – GracePeriod). The 
Current label indicates the current date and time.   
As highlighted in the earlier section, there are exceptional situations when 
the end date is brought forward. This results in the grace period commencing 
immediately for a specified duration (i.e., .GraceStart = Current, EndDate = 
Current + GracePeriod). Hence, the condition where (GraceStart = EndDate – 















Figure 12.   List of Allowable System States 
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In State 0 (OFF), the emergency state is off and there are no on-going or 
pending emergencies. The E-Device would be in this state when it was initially 
booted up. 
In State 1 (OFF-Pending), the emergency state is off and a future 
emergency has been scheduled as a result of a previously received ESM. The 
emergency state will be activated once the emergency start date is reached. 
In State 2 (ON-B4Grace), the emergency state is on and the user is in the 
midst of an emergency. However, the grace period has not commenced yet. 
In State 3 (ON-InGrace), the emergency state is on and the user is in the 
midst of an emergency. The grace period has commenced and the emergency is 
expected to end soon.  
To preserve the integrity of the state transitions, we define conditions that 
must be satisfied for all transitions. 
[AXIOM 1] For a given MissionID, StartDate < GraceStart < EndDate 
For a given emergency, the StartDate must precede the 
GraceStart, and the GraceStart must precede the EndDate. This 
prevents scenarios whereby an emergency ends before it was 
actually started. 
[AXIOM 2] For a given MissionID, once the emergency has commenced, 
the StartDate shall never be changed. 
For a given emergency, the TOC is allowed to make changes to the 
StartDate only if the emergency has not yet commenced. This 
prevents an E-device from having to perform multiple emergency 
starts and stops which may result in state de-synchronization.  
[AXIOM 3] Every ESM that is to be processed shall have an emergency 
counter value that is higher than the previously processed ESM. 
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This axiom prevents the effects of a later ESM from being 
overwritten by an earlier ESM. This anomaly is possible when 
ESMs arrive out of sequence. 
[AXIOM 4] For a given MissionID, once the emergency is over, none of 
the emergency parameters shall be changed. 
For a given emergency that has already ended, the TOC is 
prohibited from making changes to any of its parameters. This 
prevents an emergency from having to start and stop repeatedly 
resulting in state de-synchronization. 
Table 10 provides a summary of our discussion. 
 
State 
Symbols Prequisite Condition Description 
State 0 
(OFF) 
For all MissionID where 
(MissionID > 0), EndDate  < 
Current 
Emergency state ON, no ongoing 





StartDate > Current Emergency state OFF, pending 
emergency sequence (i.e. will 




(StartDate <= Current) & 
(EndDate > Current) & 
((EndDate – Current) >= 
GracePeriod) 
Emergency state ON, grace period 




(StartDate <= Current) & 
(EndDate > Current) & 
((EndDate – Current) < 
GracePeriod) & (GracePeriod > 
0) 
Emergency state ON, grace period 
has commenced 
Table 10.   Summary of System States 
3. State Notifications 
State transitions typically change emergency state from OFF to ON or vice 
versa. Occasionally, they will also involve commencement of the grace period. 
These events are of interest to the user and are communicated via the 
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setMsgArea interface in LPSK. This interface allows the ESM manager to display 
a message to the user via the PL1 display area. Displayed messages are specific 
to each state transition. Five message templates necessary during the state 
transitions are shown in Table 11. 
 
Template Name Description 
EMERGENCY_FUTURE Display “[OFF] Pending emergency state at hhmm hrs.” 
EMERGENCY_INITIATE Display “[ON] Emergency state is currently ACTIVE. Ending at hhmm hrs.”  
EMERGENCY_CANCEL Display “[OFF] Pending emergency state has been cancelled.” 
EMERGENCY_WARN 
Display “[ON] Emergency state ending at hhm  hrs. 
Please ensure your work in the emergency partition is 
saved.” 
NORMAL Display “[OFF] Normal mode. Not in emergency state.” 
Table 11.   List of Message Display Templates 
The choice of which template to use will be highlighted in the state 
transition chart in subsequent sections. 
4. Shorthand Notations 
Given four allowable system states, there are potentially sixteen possible 
state transitions among them. We utilize 14 different transitions. To simplify and 
improve the readability of these transitions, a shorthand notation is used to 







Shorthand Notation Description 
StartDate Original StartDate value as stored in the system 
in.StartDate StartDate value as stored in the incoming ESM message
StartDate’ Updated StartDate value in the system 
Table 12.   Notations for describing field 
Table 12 shows an example of the notation used to describe the same 
field but when it is assigned different values at different times. In our example, we 
have a StartDate field in the E-Device. The original value of this field is referred 
to as StartDate. This field was updated as a result of an incoming ESM. The 
StartDate value in the ESM is referred to as in.StartDate (i.e. in for input). After 
this field was updated, the new value as stored on the E-Device is referred to as 
StartDate’. 
 
Shorthand Notation Expanded Notation Description 
in.E-past (in.EndDate < Current) The emergency has ended 
in.E-started (in.StartDate <= Current) 
& 
(in.EndDate > Current) 
In the midst of the emergency 
in.E-future (in.StartDate > Current) Pending emergency 
in.E-cancel (in.StartDate = 
in.EndDate) 
Cancelling an emergency that 
has not commenced yet 
in.is-room4grace (in.EndDate – Current) >= 
in.GracePeriod 
The current emergency has not 
commenced grace period yet 
in.no-room4grace (in.EndDate – Current) < 
in.GracePeriod 
The current emergency is 
already in its grace period 
in.allow_grace_period (in.GracePeriod > 0) Provision for grace period 
in.not_allow_grace_period (in.GracePeriod = 0) Grace period is not allowed 
Table 13.   Notations for describing conditions 
When describing state transitions, we specify the necessary conditions for 
the transition to take place. The shorthand notation for these is shown in Table 
13. 
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5. State Transition Chart 
A state transition chart as shown in Table 14 describes the transitions. A 
transition occurs when either of two events occurs.  The first event is the receipt 
of an ESM from the TOC. The ESM could signify the beginning or end of an 
emergency. It could also indicate an update in the emergency parameters. The 
ESM manager will determine the resultant state and perform the required 
actions. 
The second event is the occurrence of a timer interrupt to the ESM 
manager. This timer is used as a means to inform the ESM manager that a 
certain amount of time has elapsed and a state change or notification is required. 
An example of its use could be to end the emergency in thirty minutes. The LPSK 
interface, setTimer, is invoked so that the kernel will inform the ESM manager 
once thirty minutes has elapsed. 
The state transition chart shows all the possible state transitions and is 
made up of sixteen transition cells with the following information: 
• Transition Identifier The identifier is to uniquely identify each 
transition cell 
• Critical Input This lists the emergency parameters that were 
referenced within the condition (see critical condition) for this 
particular transition  
• Critical Condition This lists the conditions that must exist (e.g., in 
the incoming ESM or timer interrupt) in order for the transition to 
occur 
• Actions This lists the operation(s) that take place when the 
transition occurs 
We will walk through a sample cell depicting the transition from state 0 to 
state 2, as listed in Figure 13, to understand how to interpret the notation. 
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C. in.StartDate, in.EndDate, in.GracePeriod
 
(in.E-started) & (in.is-room4grace) 
 
Mission’ := Input 
setMsgArea(EMERGENCY_INITIATE), 
setFocus(TRUSTED) 
Figure 13.   Sample Transition Cell 
According to the cell description, the transition identifier is C and the 
emergency parameters that play a part in the transition are the StartDate, 
EndDate, and GracePeriod values within the incoming ESM. For the transition to 
take place, the (in.E-started) and (in.is-room4grace) conditions must be present 
in the message. The (in.E-started) notation expands to (in.StartDate <= Current) 
& (in.EndDate > Current) (see Table 13). This condition implies that the 
emergency has already started but has not yet ended. The (in.is-room4grace) 
notation expands to (in.EndDate – Current) >= in.GracePeriod. This condition 
implies that the grace period has not commenced yet. If both conditions are 
present, the transition from state 0 to state 2 occurs. For the transition to be 
successful, the three actions must be completed. The Mission’ = Input notation 
indicates that the emergency parameters on the E-Device will be overwritten by 
those of the incoming ESM (see Table 12). The 
setMsgArea(EMERGENCY_INITIATE) notation denotes that this function call will 
be activated based on the EMERGENCY_INITIATE message template as 
illustrated in Table 11. Lastly, the setFocus(TRUSTED) notation specifies a 
setFocus interface call to the trusted partition. 
While it may not be obvious on the state transition chart, it should be 
noted that receiving an invalid ESM does not trigger a state transition. The 
following are examples of invalid ESM: 
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• Receiving an ESM from another entity other than the TOC 
• Receiving an ESM that has a StartDate that is later than the 
EndDate 
• Receiving an ESM that has an emergency counter value that is 
lesser than the previously processed ESM 
• Receiving an ESM that has incorrect values such as non-matching 
Device ID, or negative grace period. 
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  Starting State 
  State 0 (OFF) State 1 (OFF-Pending) State 2 (ON-B4Grace) State 3 (ON-InGrace) 
  For all MissionID where (MissionID > 0), endDate  < Current StartDate > Current 
(StartDate <= Current) & 
(EndDate > Current) & 
((EndDate – Current) >= GracePeriod) 
(StartDate <= Current) & 
(EndDate > Current) & 
((EndDate – Current) < GracePeriod) 














 A.  in.EndDate 
 
(in.E-past) 
E. in.StartDate, in.EndDate 
 
(in.E-cancel) or (in.E-past) 
 
Mission’ = Input 
setMsgArea(EMERGENCY_CANCEL) 





Mission’ = Input 
setMsgArea(EMERGENCY_END) 
setFocus(TRUSTED) 









































Mission’ = Input 
setMsgArea(EMERGENCY_FUTURE) 



































C. in.StartDate, in.EndDate, 
in.GracePeriod 
 
(in.E-started) & (in.is-room4grace) 
 
Mission’ := Input 
setMsgArea(EMERGENCY_INITIATE), 
setFocus(TRUSTED) 
G. in.StartDate, in.EndDate, 
in.GracePeriod 
 
((in.E-started) & (in.is-room4grace)) 
OR (in.timer_interrupt) 
 
Mission’ = Input 
setMsgArea(EMERGENCY_INITITATE) 
setFocus(TRUSTED) 




Mission’ = Input 
setMsgArea(EMERGENCY_INITITATE) 





























D. in.StartDate, in.EndDate, 
in.GracePeriod 
 
(in.E-started) & (in.no-room4grace) 
& (in.allow_grace_period) 
 
MissionID’ = in.MissionID 
GracePeriod’ = in.GracePeriod 
StartDate’ = in.StartDate 
EndDate’ = Current + in.GracePeriod 
setMsgArea(EMERGENCY_INITIATE), 
setFocus(TRUSTED) 
H. in.StartDate, in.EndDate, 
in.GracePeriod 
 
(in.E-started) & (in.no-room4grace) & 
(in.allow_grace_period) 
 
MissionID’ = in.MissionID 
GracePeriod’ = in.GracePeriod 
StartDate’ = in.StartDate 




L. in.EndDate, in.GracePeriod 
 




MissionID’ = in.MissionID 
GracePeriod’ = in.GracePeriod 
StartDate’ = in.StartDate 
EndDate’ = Current + in.GracePeriod 
setMsgArea(EMERGENCY_WARN) 





MissionID’ = in.MissionID 
GracePeriod’ = in.GracePeriod 
StartDate’ = in.StartDate 
EndDate’ = Current + in.GracePeriod 
setMsgArea(EMERGENCY_WARN) 




6. State Transition Diagram 
Figure 14 shows another representation of the state transitions, in pictorial 
format. 
 
Figure 14.   State Transition Diagram 
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7. State Transition Table 
Table 15 provides the complete details of the state transitions in tabular 
format without the use of shorthand notation. 
 
Transition Name A:  0 -> 0 
Critical Inputs in.EndDate 
Critical Relationships (in.EndDate < Current) 
Actions - 
  
Transition Name B: 0 -> 1 
Critical Inputs in.StartDate 
Critical Relationships (in.StartDate > Current) 
Actions 
StartDate’ = in.startDate 
EndDate’ = in.endDate 
GracePeriod’ = in.GracePeriod 
setMsgArea(EMERGENCY_FUTURE) 
  
Transition Name C: 0 -> 2 
Critical Inputs in.StartDate, in.EndDate, in.GracePeriod 
Critical Relationships (in.StartDate <= Current) & (in.EndDate > Current) & ((in.EndDate – Current) >= in.GracePeriod) 
Actions 
StartDate’ = in.startDate 
EndDate’ = in.endDate 








Name D: 0 -> 3 
Critical Inputs in.StartDate, in.EndDate, in.GracePeriod 
Critical 
Relationships 
(in.StartDate <= Current) & (in.EndDate > Current) & 
((in.EndDate – Current) < in.GracePeriod) & 
(in.GracePeriod > 0) 
Actions 
StartDate’ = in.startDate 
EndDate’ = Current + in.GracePeriod 





Name E: 1 -> 0 
Critical Inputs in.StartDate, in.EndDate 
Critical 
Relationships (in.StartDate = in.EndDate) or (in.EndDate < Current) 
Actions 
StartDate’ = in.startDate 
EndDate’ = in.endDate 




Name F: 1 -> 1 
Critical Inputs in.StartDate 
Critical 
Relationships (in.StartDate > Current) 
Actions 
StartDate’ = in.startDate 
EndDate’ = in.endDate 




Name G: 1 -> 2 
Critical Inputs in.StartDate, in.EndDate, in.GracePeriod 
Critical 
Relationships 
((in.StartDate <= Current) & (in.EndDate > Current) & 
((in.EndDate – Current) >= in.GracePeriod)) OR 
in.timer_interrupt 
Actions 
StartDate’ = in.startDate 
EndDate’ = in.endDate 







Name H: 1 -> 3 
Critical Inputs in.StartDate, in.EndDate, in.GracePeriod 
Critical 
Relationships 
(in.StartDate <= Current) & (in.EndDate > Current) & 
((in.EndDate – Current) < in.GracePeriod) & 
(in.GracePeriod > 0) 
Actions 
StartDate’ = in.startDate 
EndDate’ = Current + in.GracePeriod 





Name I: 2 -> 0 
Critical Inputs in.EndDate, in.GracePeriod 
Critical 
Relationships (in.EndDate < Current) & (in.GracePeriod = 0) 
Actions 
StartDate’ = in.startDate 
EndDate’ = in.endDate 





Name J: 2 -> 1 
Critical Inputs - 
Critical 
Relationships 
Disallowed due to violation of Axiom 2: once the emergency 




Name K: 2 -> 2 
Critical Inputs in.EndDate, in.GracePeriod 
Critical 
Relationships (in.EndDate – Current) >= (in.GracePeriod) 
Actions 
StartDate’ = in.startDate 
EndDate’ = in.endDate 







Name L: 2 -> 3 
Critical Inputs in.StartDate, in.EndDate, in.GracePeriod 
Critical 
Relationships 
((in.StartDate <= Current) & (in.EndDate > Current) & 
((in.EndDate – Current) < in.GracePeriod) & (in.GracePeriod > 
0)) OR in.timer_interrupt 
Actions 
StartDate’ = in.startDate 
EndDate’ = Current + in.GracePeriod 




Name M: 3 -> 0 
Critical Inputs in.EndDate, in.GracePeriod 
Critical 
Relationships 
((in.EndDate < Current) & (in.GracePeriod = 0)) OR 
in.timer_interrupt 
Actions 
StartDate’ = in.startDate 
EndDate’ = in.endDate 





Name N: 3 -> 1 
Critical Inputs - 
Critical 
Relationships 
Disallowed due to violation of Axiom 2: once the emergency 




Name O: 3 -> 2 
Critical Inputs in.EndDate, in.GracePeriod 
Critical 
Relationships (in.EndDate – Current) >= (in.GracePeriod) 
Actions 
StartDate’ = in.startDate 
EndDate’ = in.endDate 






Transition Name P: 3 -> 3 
Critical Inputs in.StartDate, in.EndDate, in.GracePeriod 
Critical 
Relationships 
(in.StartDate <= Current) & (in.EndDate > Current) & 
((in.EndDate – Current) < in.GracePeriod) & 
(in.GracePeriod > 0) 
Actions 
StartDate’ = in.startDate 
EndDate’ = in.endDate 
GracePeriod’ = in.GracePeriod 
setMsgArea(EMERGENCY_WARN) 
Table 15.   State Transition Tables 
8. Message Format 
Table 16 shows an implementation of the ESM. The last row indicates the 
field size in number of bytes. 




















1 4 8 8 4 2 4 4 2 1 
Table 16.   ESM Message Format 
Each field is explained as followed: 
Type This indicates a message type field. The E-Device will support 
multiple applications and the use of a type field will differentiate them from one 
another. A 1-byte field allows up to 256 different message types to be supported. 
Date/Time This is the date and time when the ESM was transmitted by the 
TOC. The granularity should be in terms of number of seconds from an agreed 




Sender Device ID This 8-byte field uniquely identifies the hardware device 
of the TOC 
Receiver Device ID This 8-byte field uniquely identifies the E-Device that 
is the intended recipient of the ESM 
Mission ID This is a unique identifier for each emergency under a specific 
TOC. A 4-byte field allows up to 232 different emergencies before a rollover is 
required. 
Emergency Counter This is a running numbering sequence that is tagged 
to each ESM transmitted by the TOC. The purpose is to allow the receivers to 
determine the most recent message. 
Start Date The date and time when the emergency will start. It is based on 
the same granularity as the Date/Time field. 
End Date The date and time when the emergency will end. It is based on 
the same granularity as the Date/Time field. 
Grace Period The amount of time (in seconds) provided to the user to 
save or finish his work in the emergency partition before the emergency state 
terminates. A 2-byte field allows a maximum of up to 18 hours. Use 0 for this field 
if the grace period is disallowed. 
Partition Number This field is reserved for future use when multiple 
emergency partitions could be installed on the E-Device. Each emergency will 
require different sets of partitions to be unlocked. A 1-byte field supports up to 8 
emergency partitions. 
The total size of an ESM is 38 bytes. Table 17 shows an implementation 
of the acknowledgement message that is sent to the TOC when the E-Device has 























1 4 8 8 4 2 4 1 
Table 17.   ESM Acknowledgement Message Format 
The total size of an ESM acknowledgement is 32 bytes. The fields are 
largely similar to the ESM message except for the following: 
Acknowledging Emergency Counter This contains the emergency counter 
value for which this acknowledgement is intended. 
New End Date Certain state transitions require the end date to be 
extended. This field contains the updated end date as computed by the E-Device. 
If no extension is required, it will contain the same EndDate value as stored in the 
originating ESM. 
Current Emergency State This indicates the resultant emergency state of 
the E-Device as a result of the previously received ESM 
E. MAINTAINING TIMING CONSISTENCY 
A challenge in distributed computing is the ability to be able to synchronize 
timing across all nodes. The timely declaration of emergency states relies on 
both TOC and E-Devices having a common timing reference. 
A time keeping mechanism such as the Network Time Protocol (NTP) [33] 
should be used to ensure timing consistency. However, in the absence of such a 
mechanism at this phase of the project, we require that the correct date, time and 
time zone to be correctly configured at the depot. In addition, with the exception 





The depot will be the entity responsible for the preparation and issuance of 
the E-Devices. It must be able to identify the users in order to provide E-Device 
customization of the following: 
• Setting up the T-TASI system software 
• One-time synchronization with time server 
• E-Device Customization 
o Creating normal, trusted, and emergency partitions 
o Creating user account on the E-Device 
o Setup own Device ID 
• ESM Manager Configuration 
o Setup Device IDs of authorized TOC 
o Setup default emergency partition number 
• Heartbeat Manager Configuration 
o Setup Device ID of heartbeat recipient 
o Setup IP address of heartbeat recipient 
o Configure heartbeat transmission interval 
o Configure whether to enable location information within 
heartbeat message 
• Installing PKI Materials 
o Public key certificates belonging to root CA, issuing CA, and 
other PKI users 
o Certificate Revocation List 
o Private key 
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The user will sign out the E-Device and the root CA will be notified. Root 
CA will subsequently update the repository to reflect the new certificate status. 
The proposed PKI process is as depicted in Figure 15.  
 
Figure 15.   PKI Process 
Venturing into the details of creating a PKI is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, such an infrastructure is necessary for the purpose of 
administering public-private keys, certificates, and the CRL. 
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V. DESIGN ANALYSIS 
This chapter outlines the design analysis of the ESM and Heartbeat 
Managers. The analysis is a proof of concept design that is described using 
sequence diagrams depicting the control flow and call parameters. It also 
includes deriving the data structures required to support the operations. The aim 
of the analysis is to present technical details sufficient to inform the 
implementation of both ESM and Heartbeat Managers in the next project phase. 
A. HEARTBEAT MANAGER 
This section introduces the two components of the heartbeat manager. 
They comprise of the Heartbeat_Mgr (V.A.1) and the HeartbeatProfile (V.A.2) 
modules. The Heartbeat_Mgr is responsible for transmitting heartbeat messages 
at regular intervals. It queries HeartbeatProfile for recipient information and also 
the location information of the E-Device. After every transmission, it increments 
the heartbeat counter in HeartbeatProfile. 
1. Heartbeat_Mgr 
Description This module is responsible for processing LPSK timer 
interrupts. It also handles the transmission of the heartbeat message as a 








a. Public void sigHandle_Timeout () 
This interface initializes heartbeat processing. It is called by the LPSK 
when a timer interrupt occurs. At the end of its processing, it notifies the 
LPSK via the endHandler interface. 
2. HeartbeatProfile 
Description This module is responsible for storing heartbeat parameters. 
Interfaces are provided for external components to query these 
parameters. 
Attributes 
a. string dest_device_id = 0; 
This attribute stores the device ID of the heartbeat message recipient 
which typically is the TOC. This field is configured at the depot. 
b. string dest_ip_addr; 
This attribute stores the IP address of the heartbeat message recipient 
which typically is the TOC. This field is configured at the depot. 
c. int tx_interval = 0; 
This attribute stores the transmission interval (in seconds) of the heartbeat 
message. If it is set to 0, the heartbeat message will be disabled. This field 
is configured at the depot. 
d. int heartbeat_counter = 0; 
This attribute stores the current counter of the heartbeat message. Every 





receiver to determine the message sequence and allow it to determine 
how many of the messages were missed. The rollover will happen when 
the counter reaches 216 - 1. 
e. bool allowLocationBroadcast = TRUE; 
This attribute indicates whether location information should be embedded 
in the heartbeat message. If set to FALSE, both getLongitude() and 
getLatitude() interfaces will return 0xFFFFFFFF regardless of availability 
of location information. This attribute is configured at the depot. 
f. long longitude = 0xFFFFFFFF; 
This attribute stores the longitude coordinate of the E-Device. The value is 
derived from the location provider of the E-Device (typically the GPS or 
WiFi). This field is initialized to 0xFFFFFFFF if location is unavailable. 
g. long latitude = 0xFFFFFFFF; 
This attribute stores the latitude coordinate of the E-Device. The value is 
derived from the location provider of the E-Device (typically the GPS or 
WiFi). This field is initialized to 0xFFFFFFFF if location is unavailable. 
Interfaces 
a. Public int getDeviceID () 
This interface allows querying of the dest_device_id field. 
b. Public string getIPAddr () 
This interface allows querying of the dest_ip_addr field. 
c. Public int getInterval () 
This interface allows querying of the tx_interval field. 
d. Public int getCounter () 
This interface allows querying of the heartbeat_counter field. 
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e. Public long getLongitude () 
This interface allows querying of the longitude field. It will return 
0xFFFFFFFF if the allowLocationBroadcast attribute is FALSE. 
f. Public long getLatitude () 
This interface allows querying of the latitude field. It will return 
0xFFFFFFFF if the allowLocationBroadcast attribute is FALSE. 
g. Public void incrementCounter () 
This interface increments the heartbeat_counter by one. It shall be called 
after each heartbeat message transmission. If the next increment will 
exceed the limit of an integer data type (i.e. 232 - 1), the counter will reset 
to 1. 
B. EMERGENCY STATE MESSAGE MANAGER 
This section introduces the three components of the ESM Manager. They 
are: the ESM_Mgr (V.B.1), ESM_TimeoutHandler (V.B.2), and the 
EmergencyProfile (V.B.3) modules. The ESM_Mgr is responsible for processing 
all incoming ESM, whereas ESM_TimeoutHandler is responsible for handling 
timeouts. Both modules will query and update EmergencyProfile for the 
emergency parameters.  
1. ESM_Mgr 
Description This module is responsible for verifying and processing 
incoming ESM. It also handles the starting and stopping of emergency 
states within the E-Device as a result of the received ESM. The sequence 








a. Public void sigHandle_ReceiveMsg (byte[] esmMsg) 
This signal handler is called by the UDP module when a new ESM is 
received. It initiates the processing of a message (see Figure 18), 
including message verification, emergency state transition, and generating 
an acknowledgement back to the sender. At the end of its processing, it 
notifies the LPSK via the endHandler interface. 
b. Private void verifyMessage () 
This private interface is called by sigHandle_ReceiveMsg after a new ESM 
is received. It runs through a list of verification checks to ensure the 
validity of the message. The checks ensure that: 
• Ensure the ESM is from an authorized TOC 
• The emergency counter value is higher than the previously 
processed ESM (see Axiom 3) 
• The StartDate, EndDate, and GracePeriod values are well-formed 
(see Axiom 1) 
• The E-Device is the intended recipient of the ESM 
c. Private void createAcknolwdgement () 
This private interface is called by sigHandle_ReceiveMsg upon the 
successful processing of the ESM. An acknowledgement message is 
generated and sent to the TOC. 
d. Private void processMessage () 
This private interface is called by sigHandle_ReceiveMsg and handles the 
processing of the ESM including its emergency state transitions, querying 
emergency parameters, and handles the interfaces to other components. 
Figure 18 shows a continuation of the processMessage interface that was 
shown in Figure 17Error! Reference source not found. (step 5). It 




Figure 18.   processMessage Interface 
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e. Private int determineTransition (int missionID, int startDate, int 
endDate,  int gracePeriod, int currentDate) 
This private interface is called by processMessage and is responsible for 
determining state transitions. It achieves this by reviewing incoming 
emergency parameters, analyzing their impact on existing parameters, 
and deriving the resultant state. 
f. Private int calculateEndDate (int currentDate, int gracePeriod) 
This private interface is called by processMessage and is responsible for 
re-computing the end date when transiting to state 3 (ON-InGrace). 
2. ESM_TimeoutHandler 
Description This module is responsible for processing LPSK timer 
interrupts. It also handles the starting and stopping of emergency states 
within the E-Device as a result of these interrupts. At the end of its 
processing, it notifies the LPSK via the endHandler interface. Figure 19 
depicts the sequence of actions taking place when a LPSK timer interrupt 








a. Public void sigHandle_Timeout () 
This interface initializes the timeout handling. It is called by the LPSK 
whenever a timer interrupt occurs. This timeout occurs as a result of a 
previously executed setTimer interface. 
b. Private int determineCurrentState () 
This private interface is called by sigHandle_Timeout during the interrupt 
handling process. It is used to identify the current system state to 
determine the significance of the timeout. For example, if the current state 
is 1 (OFF-Pending), the timeout would indicate the start of an emergency. 
However, if the current state is 2 (On-B4Grace), the timeout would indicate 
the commencement of the grace period. 
3. EmergencyProfile 
Description This module is responsible for maintaining the emergency 
parameters. It handles all parameter read and write requests and provides 
interfaces for external entities to query them. It is called by 
sigHandle_ReceiveMsg via the update interface. It is also called by both 
processMessage and sigHandle_Timeout via the getParameters interface. 
Attributes 
a. int emergency_counter = 0; 
This attribute stores the emergency counter of the previously processed 
ESM. Based on Axiom 3, the newer value shall always be higher than the 
current value. The rollover will happen when the counter reaches 216 - 1. 
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b. string authorizedSender = “TOC”; 
This attribute stores the device ID of all parties that have been authorized 
to send ESM to the current E-Device. It shall contain only TOC entries as 
they are the only ones allowed to declare emergency states. 
c. struct MISSION { 
int missionID = 0; 
int startDate = 0; 
int endDate = 0; 
int gracePeriod = 0; 
 
This structure contains parameters pertaining to a specific emergency. 
Each emergency is identified by MissionID and the E-Device may contain 
multiple scheduled emergencies at any one time. 
Interfaces 
a. Public int getCounter () 
This interface allows querying of the emergency_counter field. 
b. Public bool verifySender (string sender) 
Given a device ID, this interface will return a boolean value indicating 
whether the sender associated with the ID is authorized to send ESMs. 
This is accomplished by matching the input string with the 
authorizedSender field in EmergencyProfile. 
c. Public bool update (int counter, int missionID, int startDate, int 
endDate, int gracePeriod) 
This interface overwrites existing emergency parameters within 
EmergencyProfile with new values that are passed in as arguments. 
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d. Public string getParameters () 
This interface returns a list of emergency parameter values within 
EmergencyProfile. The parameters is returned as a comma delimited 
string. 
C. OTHERS 
This section discusses the expected interfaces of the supporting 
infrastructure. However, instead of providing an exhaustive review of all their 
interfaces, we will focus on those that directly support the operations of both ESM 
and Heartbeat Managers. These supporting infrastructure functions are 
comprised of the LPSK, IP, and UDP modules. They are responsible for the 
receiving and sending of ESM and heartbeat messages. In addition, the LPSK is 
also responsible for timer services. 
1. LPSK_Interface 
Description The LPSK creates exported resources from the platform’s 
physical resources, partitions the exported resources and controls 
interactions between the partitions. 
Interfaces 
a. Public void setMsgArea (string displayText) 
This interface provides a means to display application messages to the 
user. By using this interface, the application can print a string to the PL1 
display area which is a trusted area that is managed by the kernel. 
b. Public void setFocus (int partitionNum) 
This interface signals the LPSK to switch focus to a specific partition. In 
the case of the ESM Manager, this interface is activated whenever the 
emergency state goes from OFF to ON or vice versa. The ESM Manager 
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will set focus to the trusted partition for purpose of obtaining the user’s 
input regarding which partition, emergency or normal, to toggle to. 
c. Public void setTimer (int channel, int timeout, int handle) 
A timer service is provided by the LPSK and this interface allows that 
service to be activated. Applications are each assigned a specific channel 
for using the timer service. This allows the LPSK to differentiate between 
each caller. Upon timeout (based on seconds), the LPSK will raise an 
interrupt on the predefined timeout handler. 
d. Public void send (byte[] msg) 
This interface is called by the IP module to request LPSK to transmit an IP 
message.  
e. Public void endHandler () 
This interface signals to the LPSK that interrupt handling for a particular 
interrupt has been completed. LPSK may proceed to free any resources 




f. Public string getCurrentDateTime () 
This interface is called by calculateEndDate and returns the local system 
time. The time zone must be included in the returned string. 
2. Internet Protocol 
Description IP is the network layer protocol used for data communication 




a. Public void sigHandle_Received (byte[] ipPkt) 
This interface is called by the LPSK when a new IP packet is received. 
b. Public void send (string destIP, byte[] msg) 
This interface is called by the UDP module to send a message via the IP 
module. The destination IP address is passed in as an argument. 
3. User Datagram Protocol 
Description UDP is the transport layer mechanism for both ESM and 
Heartbeat Managers. 
Interfaces 
a. Public void sigHandle_Received (byte[] udpPkt) 
This interface is called by the IP module when a new UDP message is 
received. 
b. Public void send (string destIP, int srcPort, int destPort, byte[] 
msg) 
This interface is called by both sigHandle_ReceiveMsg and 
sigHandle_Timeout and requests that the UDP module transmit a 
message. The destination IP address, source and destination port 




This section reviews the requirements for ESM and Heartbeat Managers 
and determines whether they have been met. 
 
Identifier Requirements Design 
1.1 
The E-Device shall verify the 
correctness of the ESM prior 
processing it. 
sigHandle_ReceiveMsg to activate 
verifyMessage interface (see Figure 17 - 
Step 4) 
1.2 
The E-Device shall verify that the 
ESM is from the TOC prior 
processing it. 
verifyMessage interface (See V.B.1b) 
1.3 
The E-Device shall acknowledge 
the sender of the ESM upon 
successful validation of a 
received ESM. 
sigHandle_ReceiveMsg to activate 
createAcknowledgement interface (see 
Figure 17 - Step 7) 
1.4 
The E-Device shall allow access 
to the emergency partition when 
the emergency has started 
sigHandle_ReceiveMsg to activate 
update interface (see Figure 17 - Step 6) 
Emergency state is set to TRUE. 
1.5 
The E-Device shall prohibit 
access to the emergency 
partition when the emergency 
has ended 
sigHandle_ReceiveMsg to activate 
update interface (see Figure 17 - Step 6) 
Emergency state is set to FALSE. 
3.1 
TOC should be able to estimate 
the number of emergency 
responders that are near the 
emergency scene. 
Heartbeat Manager to provide status 
update (See V.A.1) 
Table 18.   ESM and Heartbeat Managers’ Requirements 
As shown in Table 18, the requirements of the ESM and Heartbeat 
Managers have been satisfied. 
This chapter realizes the high-level design analysis described in Chapter 
IV and confirms that the design is consistent and complete so that detailed 
design is supported. The described data structures, flow control, and interface 





The summary chapter reviews related work in similar areas, and also 
provides direction for subsequent research. A concluding section provides a 
recap of our research efforts in designing the emergency signaling mechanism. 
A. RELATED WORK 
We review other emergency access solutions that temporarily extend 
one’s security privileges. One such approach is break-glass [34] and its purpose 
is to provide a quick means for extending a person’s access rights in exceptional 
cases [35]. Implementing break-glass typically involves pre-staging “emergency 
accounts” that have greater access rights. The distribution of these accounts is 
carefully managed to provide timely access when needed. These accounts are 
monitored so that the security administrator is alerted when they are used. There 
are procedures in place to perform clean-up after the break-glass action is 
completed. The key difference with the T-TASI system is that the work we 
propose does not require the creation of “emergency accounts”. It extends the 
break-glass approach by preventing the unwarranted dispersal of sensitive 
information due to the potential misuse of such accounts. In addition, within T-
TASI, the privileged access rights are automatically revoked after the crisis. 
Another approach is optimistic security [36] where it assumes that the risk 
of failure and recovery cost is low compared to the cost of not granting access. It 
depends on strong authentication and auditing processes so that users can be 
associated with given actions. It also assumes that for any transformation on data 
or security properties of that data such as confidentiality, integrity, etc., there is a 
compensating transaction that exists to reverse this transformation. The key 
difference with the T-TASI system is that the T-TASI system does not need to 
back out of transformations because unauthorized accesses are prevented. Also, 
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it is not necessary to incorporate compensating transactions for reversing an 
incorrect transformation. This makes T-TASI a much simpler architecture.  
Ferreira et al. [37] propose a Break The Glass policy approach that 
implements the security policy in the application logic. Access control is defined 
based on the identity of the individual rather than the role he belongs to for better 
granularity. The key difference with the T-TASI system is in its scalability. In T-
TASI, the same security policy for extraordinary access and data confinement 
can be applied to a variety of scenarios. Unlike the Break the Glass policy, the 
policy is built into the architectural framework and does not reside in the 
application.   
A System-Of-Systems (SOS) Security approach proposed in [38] looks at 
constructing high assurance composite systems from existing systems with 
varying security properties. The key difference with the T-TASI system is that T-
TASI deals with both inter- and intra-site data flows. Secure channels are setup 
to govern the communication among the partitions within an E-Device, and 
among partitions of different E-Devices (i.e., remote trusted channels). SOS 
Security focuses on modeling inter-site data flows based on a dynamic 
networking environment.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
While the design was developed taking into account the security 
requirements, we have largely assumed a CONOPS environment where the E-
Device is always in possession of its authorized owner. In some situations, the 
threat of hostile possession of an E-Device must be considered. Hence, we 
propose the following research areas as a follow-up to mitigate the risk of E-
Devices falling into the wrong hands. 
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1. Storage Encryption 
Storage encryption is used to encrypt data at rest (i.e .on secondary 
storage). Hence, these solutions can be used to safeguard the data in the 
emergency partitions so that the data are inaccessible even if the attacker has 
physical access to the E-Device. The study will look at whether the data 
associated with each emergency partition should be encrypted using different 
keys and that these keys be provided by the TOC instead of being stored within 
the E-Device. 
2. Remote Purging 
The objective of remote purging is to delete sensitive material such as 
privileged information within the emergency partitions, private key, certificates, 
and proprietary software residing in the E-Device. The purge operation will take 
place when the E-Device is no longer in the possession of its authorized users. 
When the loss of an E-Device is reported to the TOC, the TOC will issue a device 
revocation message to the affected E-Device which will proceed with the purge 
operation in the background. The study should examine alternate means of 
protecting the data, especially if the E-Device was lost after the emergency state 
was declared. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The objective of this work was is to investigate and propose a means to 
perform emergency signaling within a tactical IP network. This provides a means 
to provide secure, transient access to privileged information and also supports 
revocation of access to it after the emergency. We embarked on our research 
using both top-down or bottom-up approaches. 
The top-down approach reviews various communication protocols and 
evaluates their merits with respect to their suitability for use on the emergency 
network. The evaluation was conducted based on the protocols being able to 
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meet security requirements and the integration challenges with the existing TCB. 
After selecting the IPSec protocol, we proceeded with an analysis of how the 
protocol will be used in supporting our CONOPS. The analysis includes how 
IPSec should be configured, choice of cipher suite, and integration strategies to 
the TCB. 
The bottom-up approach reviews specific requirements pertaining to both 
Emergency and Heartbeat Managers. We examined the possible system states 
and state transitions including the prerequisite conditions and actions taken after 
a transition. We proceeded by defining the essential data structures and 
message semantics for both emergency signal and heartbeat messages. We 
also propose how both modules can be integrated into existing the TCB 
architecture. Subsequently, we examined the choice of transport layer 
mechanism for transmitting the emergency signal. 
In summary, we have presented the design for a vertical slice of the 
broader T-TASI device implementation, the emergency signaling mechanism, 
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